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Abstract. This paper raises the question of the dynamic eﬀects of public spending in jobs on
labor market performance. We use a dynamic matching model and study how public jobs creation
aﬀects endogenous workers’ decisions to move on the labor market and private-sector firms’ job
creation and destruction decisions. We obtain that it exerts an attracting eﬀect and a fiscal eﬀect
on the labor market that make the unemployment rate and job flows overshoot. As an empirical
illustration, we estimate a svar model that focuses on the consequences of public job creations on
unemployment, wages and job flows dynamics. We confirm our intuition: public employment has
a significant ambiguous eﬀect on private wages.
JEL classification: J45, J21
Keywords: Public sector labor market, Unemployment dynamics
Résumé. Ce papier analyse la dynamique transitoire du marché du travail en présence
d’emplois publics. Un modèle d’appariement dynamique nous permet d’étudier comment les eﬀets
de la création d’emplois publics se propagent dans le temps en présence de deux sources d’éviction:
une concurrence entre les secteurs public et privé pour attirer les travailleurs et une pression fiscale
qui accroît le coût du travail des entreprises privées. L’eﬀet d’attraction et les externalités fiscales
exercées aﬀectent la dynamique du chômage et celle des flux de création et de destruction d’emplois
privés. Un modèle vectoriel auto-régressif, appliqué aux données américaines (1972:2-1993:4), il-
lustre empiriquement notre mécanisme théorique. Nos prédictions théoriques sont confirmées: le
chômage diminue significativement à court terme suite à la création d’emplois publics et l’emploi
public a un eﬀet ambigu significatif sur les salaires privés.
Codes JEL: J45, J21
Mots clés: Emploi public, Dynamique du chômage
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1 Introduction
The idea that government intervention acts as a stimulus for economic activity in the short run
is popular in traditional Keynesian analysis whereas in the long run, public spending is viewed as
an ineﬃcient policy. In this regard, the question of the dynamic eﬀects of public jobs creation on
labor market performance is relevant. In the short run, public jobs oﬀset the scarcity of private
jobs and reduce unemployment. By oﬀering public infrastructures, the government can exert a
positive externality on the productivity of the private sector, increasing labor demand in that
sector. However, public jobs creation is also expected to crowd-out private employment, as it
increases labor taxes, produces substitutable goods for private ones and exerts wage pressure.
This crowding-out eﬀect can be more than complete, leading to an increase in unemployment.
Thus, in the long run, public job creation can have no significant eﬀect. In this paper, we propose
to study its dynamic eﬀects on unemployment.
Theoretical papers do not have invested the question of the dynamic eﬀects of public jobs
creation on labor market performance. Some empirical papers have do it, linking its negative impact
to an increase in private wage pressure. Edin and Holmlund (1997) use pooled crossed section and
annual time series data for 22 oecd countries over the period 1968-1990. They argue that public
sector employment, in the short run, with wages and prices fixed, decreases unemployment, whereas
there is no significant long run eﬀect (i.e. in the long run, the crowding-out is complete). Some
empirical evidence on dynamic interrelations between aggregate time series on unemployment, real
wages and public employment are provided by Malley and Moutos (1996) for Sweden, Malley and
Moutos (1998) for Japan, Germany and United-States, Demekas and Kontolemis (2000) for Greece.
The crowding-out eﬀect works through a private wage pressure: improvement in employment
outlooks increases workers’ wage demands, and reduces labor demand. Demekas et al. (2000)
estimate a vectorial error correction model (vecm) with Greek data (1971:1-1993:4) on public
employment, unemployment, private and public real wages. In the long run, the crowding-out is
complete and the mean lag (half-life) of the unemployment rate is close to 3 quarters. They use a
static job search model where an increase in public wage, or employment, leads through workers’
moves on the labor market to a higher increase in private sector wage. The unemployment rate
increases as it positively depends on the wage diﬀerential between private and public sectors1 .
Malley et al. (1996) estimate a vecmodel with public employment, private employment and capital
stock on Swedish data (1962:3-1990:4). The fall in private employment, due to the increase in public
1We believe this result highly depends on some assumptions. Indeed, we expect, as Holmlund (1997), that the
crowding-out eﬀect should be more than complete when there is a public wage premium, as the attracting eﬀect of
the public sector increases with the relative level of the public wage.
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employment, starts after four quarters, with a complete crowding-out eﬀect in five years. In the
long run, the crowding-out is more than complete. Malley et al. (1998) estimate a vectorial auto-
regressive model (var) with public employment, unemployment and private wages on German data
(1960:3-1989:4), on Japan data (1965:4-1994:4) and on us data (1960:3-1996:2). They find that the
crowding-out eﬀect of public employment on private employment is complete, i.e. unemployment
is not aﬀected by changes in government employment. The mean lag is close to 10 years. However,
they argue that this eﬀect doesn’t go through a rise in private real wages.
The empirical evidence of a private wage pressure is not clear. Malley et al. (1998) use a
Choleski decomposition which assumes that unemployment comes before public employment in the
causal order. However, they can’t give any theoretical or empirical support for this assumption.
Demekas et al.’s vecm seems not relevant. First, because they use a job search model with
exogenous probabilities to move on the labor market. Individuals are perfectly insured such as
they have the same utility in and out of the labor market. Second, because the vecm’s results
(irf, fevd) are not discussed. They report a negative correlation between public employment and
private wages, which is not consistent with their theoretical model and not informative for the
response of private wages to innovations in public employment. They obtain that unemployment
is positively correlated with the wage diﬀerential but they do not test formally for the positive
impact of an increase in the wage diﬀerential on unemployment. Malley et al. (1996) do not
include wages in their vecm. Therefore, we can not conclude on the empirical relevance of private
wages as propagation channel of public jobs creation. Malley et al. (1998) attribute the fall in
private employment to taxes and fixed costs that increase disincentives for private-sector firm and
job creation. However, they don’t evaluate the relevance of such a propagation channel.
It seems that the wage channel is at best a theoretical possibility for which there is no convinc-
ing evidence. The result of a private wage pressure is obtained in bargaining models (Holmlund,
1997, Algan, Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2002) or job search models (Demekas et al., 2000), in which
the improvement of employment outlooks increases workers’ wage demands. However, fiscal impli-
cations of public jobs creation have to be taken into account. If firms can shift all the tax burden
onto workers, private wages can decline. If there is no complete shifting, we expect changes in
firms’ job creation and destruction decisions. Demand studies only find very partial shifting of
taxes onto workers (in the form of lower wage rates) and a higher, but not complete, shifting onto
labor demand (with time-series data) (Hamermesh, 1993). We believe payroll taxes are a relevant
propagation channel of the public crowding-out eﬀect on private labor demand. We propose a
theoretical model and a var estimation, in which we include private job creation and destruction
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rates to reflect fiscal distortive eﬀect of public jobs creation and to oﬀset the traditional wage
pressure result.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we propose a theoretical mechanism.
We use a dynamic matching model. This model permits to study the propagation mechanism of
the public shock on the labor market. With endogenous job creation and destruction decisions, the
asymmetries that characterize unemployment dynamics are taken into account. Instantaneously,
newly created public jobs are filled by the unemployed workers searching for a public job. Thus, in
the short run, the unemployment rate decreases and the public sector exerts an attracting eﬀect
on private workers. Due to its fiscal implications, public jobs creation aﬀects the private-sector job
creation and destruction decisions. The disincentives for private jobs creation that distortive labor
taxes generate make the unemployment rate increase. In the long run, the net impact depends on
the size of the public wage premium. In Section 4, we empirically invest the question of the dynamic
eﬀects of public job creation on the unemployment, private wages, job creation and destruction
rates. We use a structural vectorial auto-regressive (svar) technique on us data in order to
illustrate our model. The data were obtained from the oecd Employment Outlooks, lrd and
cps database. The data cover the period 1972:2-1993:4. We use short-run restrictions (Blanchard,
1989, Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992, Karamé and Mioubi, 1998). We obtain a significant short run
fall in the unemployment rate, followed by an overshooting. Labor market flows dynamics are
consistent with our matching model. We also obtain that increases in public employment rate are
partly due to innovations in unemployment, suggesting a government response to unemployment.
Public shock highly aﬀects private wages but the net impact is not clear. Section 5 concludes.
2 A dynamic matching model with public jobs
We consider a dynamic matching model of the labor market with public and private jobs. Our
model features three types of agents: private- and public- sectors workers, firms and the govern-
ment. The size of the labor force is constant and normalized to one. All individuals have the same
preferences, live infinite lives and are risk-neutral. There is a common discount rate denoted by r.
We consider a framework in which unemployed workers can search either for a public job or for a
private job, but not for both types of job at the same time. This assumption is convenient with the
fact that, in many oecd countries, the public sector has a specific hiring process, which requires
specific knowledge and/or networks. Unemployed workers can move between sectors. They search
in the sector in which the return of search is the highest. In equilibrium, there is an arbitrage
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condition, which implies that the return of search is the same in both sectors. For the sake of
simplicity, job to job mobility is not taken into account. There are lg jobs in the public sector and
lp jobs in the private sector. Accordingly, the number of unemployed workers is: u = 1− lp − lg.
2.1 Technologies
In the private sector, each firm has one job. When the job is filled, it produces a numeraire output,
using labor. All new jobs are created at maximum productivity2. We note px the productivity of a
private job where p is a general productivity parameter and x an idiosyncratic one. p is a positive
constant parameter. When a shock arrives, the idiosyncratic productivity is drawn from a general
distribution F (x), with 0 ≤ x ≤ eu. This productivity is independent of initial productivity and
irreversible. Idiosyncratic shocks arrive to jobs at Poisson rate qp. Note Jp(x) the value of a filled
job with idiosyncratic productivity x. At some of the idiosyncratic productivities that firms face,
production is profitable, but at some others it is not. When a shock arrives, it can be shown that
the optimal decision for the firm is to continue production at the new productivity if Jp(x) ≥ 0
but to destroy the job if Jp(x) < 0. As Jp(x) is a monotone continuous increasing function of x,
the job destruction rule Jp(x) < 0 satisfies the reservation property with respect to the reservation
productivity R, defined by Jp(R) = 0. By the reservation property, firms destroy all jobs with
idiosyncratic productivity x ≤ R and continue producing in all jobs with productivity x > R3 .
In the public sector, each job produces one unit of public goods, which are consumed by all
individuals. Public goods provide v(lg) utility. This utility is increasing at a decreasing rate in
the amount of the public good, i.e. v0(lg) > 0 and v00(lg) < 0. The public-sector employment and
wage levels are exogenous. Public jobs are destroyed at rate qg.
2.2 Matching function
Our model borrows from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). In the private sector, hiring a worker
and searching for a job are costly activities. Private vacant jobs and unemployed workers are
brought together in pairs through an imperfect matching process. We assume a matching function
that gives the number of jobs formed, at any moment in time, as a function of the number of
workers looking for jobs and the number of firms looking for workers. A job can be filled or vacant,
but only vacant jobs search for workers. Similarly, a worker can be employed or unemployed, but
only unemployed workers search for jobs.
2Newly-created jobs are assumed more productive than existing ones, as they benefit from the best technology
in the market. We would obtain the same qualitative results with a stochastic matching model.
3Using a minimum required idiosyncratic productivity explains why firms shut down rather than make marginal
changes that would allow them to continue in existence.
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Let up denote the number of unemployed workers who look for a private job and vp the number
of vacancies in the private sector. The number of employer-worker contacts per unit of time is given
by m (up, vp). The matching function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave
in both of its arguments, and linearly homogeneous. Linear homogeneity of the matching function
allows to express the per period probability for a private vacant job (unemployed worker) to meet
an unemployed worker (a vacant job) as a function of the labor market tightness ratio, θ = vp/up.
A vacant job can meet on average m (up, vp) /vp = m (θ) unemployed workers per period, with
m0 (·) < 0. Similarly, the rate at which unemployed job seekers can meet private jobs at each
date is θm (θ), an increasing function of θ. Since private jobs are destroyed at rate qpF (R), the
evolution of mean private-sector unemployment is given by the diﬀerence between the two flows:
u˙p = qpF (R)lp − θm(θ)up. (1)
In the public sector, the government recruits employees at random among the ug unemployed
workers who look for a public job. The evolution of public-sector unemployment is therefore given
by:
u˙g = qglg − gug. (2)
So, the evolution of total unemployment reads:
u˙ = qpF (R)lp + qglg − θm(θ)up − gug. (3)
2.3 Expected asset values
Expected profit from a filled job and from a vacant job
Using the discount rate r, the present-discounted value of expected profit from an occupied job,
with productivity in the range R ≤ x ≤ eu, satisfies:
rJp(x) = px− wp(x)(1 + τ) + qp
Z eu
R
Jp(s)dF (s) + qpF (R)V p − qpJp(x) + J˙p(x), (4)
where wp(x) is the wage rate, which is determined by a bargain between the firm and the worker
for all R < x ≤ eu. Wages are taxed at the distortive rate τ . Whenever an idiosyncratic shock
arrives, the firm continues producing for a new value Jp(s) if the new idiosyncratic productivity
is in the range R < s ≤ eu, or destroys the job for an expected return V p otherwise. J˙p is the
expected capital gain from changes in job value during adjustment.
V p is the present-discounted value of expected profit from a vacant job and it is given by:
rV p = −h+m(θ) [Jp(eu)− V p] + V˙ p,
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with h the hiring cost. In our simulations, this cost will be made proportional to the mean
productivity, as it is assumed that it is more costly to hire more productive workers.
We assume that all profit opportunities from new jobs are exploited in the steady state and
out of it, driving rents from vacant jobs to zero V p = V˙ p = 0, which implies:
Jp(eu) =
h
m(θ)
This condition states that in equilibrium, private-sector labor market tightness is such that the
expected profit from a new job is equal to the expected cost of hiring a worker.
Expected utilities of workers
We have neglected labor intensity and search costs. A private- or public-sector worker instan-
taneously enjoys the utility from his wage rate, wp(x) or wg, and from public goods, v(lg). The
unemployed workers enjoy unemployment benefits, z, and public goods, v(lg)4 . Let W pe (x), W
g
e ,
W pu and W
g
u denote, respectively, the expected present values of the lifetime utility for privately
employed, publicly employed or unemployed workers.
In the private sector, the returns from working at a job with idiosyncratic productivity x]R, eu]
satisfy:
rW pe (x) = wp(x) + v(lg) + qp
Z eu
R
W pe (s)dF (s) + qpF (R)W
p
u − qpW pe (x) + W˙ pe (x), (5)
rW pu = z + v(lg) + θm(θ) [W
p
e (eu)−W pu ] + W˙ pu , (6)
rW ge = wg + v(lg) + qg [W
g
u −W ge ] + W˙ ge ,
rW gu = z + v(lg) + g [W
g
e −W gu ] + W˙ pu . (7)
Whenever a shock arrives, the private-sector worker remains employed for new returns W pe (s) if
the new idiosyncratic productivity is in the range R < s ≤ eu, or becomes unemployed for an
expected return W pu otherwise.
4Considering exogenous unemployment benefits permit to obtain a partial shifting of the tax burden onto workers.
With unemployment benefits index-linked on current private wages, firms would shift all the tax burden onto workers,
through lower wages. However, note that the unemployment dynamics would be the same as with exogenous benefits.
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2.4 Steady-state equilibrium
In the steady-state, the mean rate of unemployment is constant, u˙ = 0. Its steady-state value is:
u =
qpF (R)
θm(θ)
lp +
qg
g
lg. (8)
Therefore, in equilibrium, the mean number of workers who go on unemployment qpF (R)lp+qglg is
equal to the mean number of workers who get out of unemployment θm(θ)up+gug. In the steady-
state, the expected capital gains, during adjustment, from changes in jobs value or in utilities are
null, J˙p(x) = W˙ pe (x) = W˙
p
u = W˙
p
u = W˙
p
u = 0.
Sharing rule
The private wage rate derived from the Nash bargaining solution is the one that maximizes the
weighted product of the worker’s and the firm’s net return from the job match S(x) = W pe (x) −
W pu + J
p(x) − V p. It satisfies wp(x) = argmax (W pe (x)−W pu )
γ (Jp(x)− V p)1−γ , with γ ∈ [0, 1]
the relative measure of labor’s bargaining strength. The first-order maximization condition gives
the sharing rule:
W pe (x)−W pu =
γ
γ + (1− γ)(1 + τ) (W
p
e (x)−W pu + Jp(x)), (9)
where γ/[γ + (1− γ)(1 + τ)] is the worker’s share in total surplus, which decreases with a rise in
the tax rate.
By substituting W pe (x), W
p
u and J
p(x) from (5), (6) and (4) into (9), one gets:
wp(x) = (1− γ)z +
γ
1 + τ
(px+ hθ), (10)
with x]R, eu].
So, the mean expected wage rate of a private employed worker reads:
E (wp(x)/x > R) = (1− γ)z +
γ
1 + τ
(pE (x/x > R) + hθ).
with E (x/x > R) =
·³
qpF (R)
qp
lp
´
eu+
³
qp(1−F (R))
qp
lp
´Z eu
R
x dF (x)1−F (R)
¸
/lp the mean idiosyncratic
productivity. We note w¯p the mean wage rate. This wage is renegociated when a new information
arrives.
Private-sector job creation and destruction conditions
Substitution of the wage equation (10) into (4) gives
(r + qp)J
p(x) = (1− γ)(px− z(1 + τ))− γhθ + qp
Z eu
R
Jp(s)dF (s). (11)
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Evaluating (11) at x = R and subtracting the resulting equation from (11) after noting Jp(R) = 0,
we get
(r + qp)Jp(x) = (1− γ)p(x−R). (12)
Substituting Jp(x) from (12) into the integral expression of (11) gives
(r + qp)J
p(x) = (1− γ)(px− z(1 + τ))− γhθ + qp(1− γ)p
r + qp
Z eu
R
(s−R)dF (s). (13)
To derive the condition for private-sector job creation, we evaluate (12) at x = eu and use the
zero-profit condition,
(1− γ)peu−R
r + qp
=
h
m(θ)
. (14)
The expected gain from a new job to the firm must be equal to the expected hiring cost that the
firm has to pay. The job creation curve is a downward-sloping curve in the space (θ,R). Indeed,
at higher R, the expected life of a job is shorter, so firms create fewer jobs and θ is lower.
To derive the condition for private-sector job destruction, we evaluate (13) at x = R and use
the zero-profit condition,
R− z(1 + τ)
p
− γhθ
(1− γ)p +
qp
r + qp
Z eu
R
(s−R)dF (s) = 0. (15)
The job destruction curve is an upward-sloping curve in the space (θ,R). Indeed, at higher θ, the
workers’ outside opportunities are better (and wages are higher) and so the reservation productivity
R is higher.
Arbitrage condition
The return of search is the same in both sectors, such as the expected utilities of unemployed
workers are equal in both sectors. The expected utilities of public- and private-sectors unemployed
workers can be rewritten respectively
rW gu = z + v(lg) + g
wg − z
r + qg + g
,
and
W pu = z + v(lg) +
γ
1− γ
hθ
1 + τ
.
The arbitrage condition, rW gu = rW
p
u , gives the equilibrium value of g, the rate at which unem-
ployed job seekers can meet public jobs:
g =
γhθ(r + qg)
[wg − z] (1− γ)(1 + τ)− γhθ
. (16)
Budget constraint
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Taxes finance public employment and unemployment benefits. Then, the budget constraint
depends on a predetermined variable, the unemployment rate. For the sake of simplicity, we relax
this constraint, assuming that there is a perfect capital market5. The government can rent into debt
at zero cost during adjustment. In the steady state and out-of it, the following budget constraint
has to be fulfilled: Z ∞
0
[τw¯plp(t)] e−rtdt =
Z ∞
0
[wglg + zu(t)] e−rtdt. (17)
with x]R, eu].
The properties of the steady-state are obtained from the simultaneous solution of the equations
of the model. The private and public-sector unemployment rates up and ug are given by the
respective steady-state conditions (1) and (2) in terms of the private- and public-sector job flows.
The private-sector job creation (14) and destruction (15) conditions determine the reservation
productivity R and the labor market tightness θ. The probability to move into public employment
g is obtained from the arbitrage condition (16). The mean private-sector wage w¯p is obtained from
the sharing rule (10). The budget constraint (17) determines the tax rate6 τ .
2.5 Out-of steady-state equilibrium
The out-of-steady-state dynamics of unemployment are given by equation (3)7. The matching
technology does not allow jumps in job formation (firms and workers can’t create jobs without
delay). The matching process is a backward-looking process that is governed by the diﬀerence
between the job creation and the job destruction flows, making unemployment a predetermined
variable at any moment in time.
We assume that firms can open and close vacancies without delay. This assumption implies that
the zero-profit condition for new vacancies holds in and out of steady state V p = V˙ p = 0. Then,
5We consider in Appendix 6.2 that the budget constraint has to be fulfilled at each period. In this case, endogenous
variables of our model are no more jump variables.
6Assuming that R, θ, w¯p and g are jump variables, we integrate the diﬀerential equations (3) and (2) between 0
and t:
u(t) =
b
a
+
?
u0 + (θm(θ)− g)
? t
0
eaxug(x)dx−
b
a
?
e−at,
and
ug(t) =
qglg
g
+
?
ug0 −
qglg
g
?
e−gt,
with a = qpF (R) + θm(θ), b = qpF (R)(1− lg) + qglg , d = g, h = qglg .
We integrate the budget constraint and substitute ug(t) into u(t):
? ∞
0
[τw¯p(1− lg − u(t))] e−rtdt =
? ∞
0
[wglg + zu(t)] e
−rtdt,
with
u(t) =
b
a
?
1− e−at
?
+ u0e
−at + (θm(θ)− g) qglg
da
(1− e−at) + (θm(θ)− g)
?
ug0 −
qglg
g
?
1
a− g
(e−bt − e−at).
7The analysis of the stability of our solution is reported in Appendix 6.1.
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labor market tightness θ is a jump variable. We also assume that firms can destroy unprofitable
jobs without delay. This assumption implies that the zero-profit condition satisfied by R holds in
and out of steady state Jp(R) = J˙p(R) = 0. So, R is a jump variable and must be on its steady
state value at all times. We assume that the sharing rule holds in and out of steady state, consistent
with the assumption that the firm and worker can renegotiate any time new information. This
assumption also requires that the mean private wage w¯p is a jump, forward-looking variable. The
arbitrage condition is an instantaneous relation. It implies that the return of search is the same in
both sectors in and out of steady state, making g a jump variable. With a perfect capital market,
θ, R, w¯p and g are jump variables, with a fixed τ .
2.6 Calibration
The model is calibrated in order to match the US economy, at the end of 90’s. The basis period is
taken to be 1 quarter. We adopt the following constant returns, Cobb-Douglas matching function
m(up, vp) = Auηpv
1−η
p , with A an eﬃciency parameter. The elasticity of the matching function η
and the bargaining power γ of the employees amount to 0.5. General productivity p is normalized at
unity. The distribution of productivity shocks is assumed to be uniform on the support [εl, εu], that
is F (x) = x−εl
εu−εl (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). Maximum productivity εu is set to reproduce
an unemployment rate u of 4.6% (oecd, 1996-2000). We use the cps data for 15-64 population on
the period 1996-2000. The data report that the mean probability, during one month, to lose his
job for a private (public) worker is 1.33% (0.63%). We use these monthly informations to compute
quarterly destruction rates. In the same way, the quaterly discount rate r is calibrated on the
montly rate of .5%. The search cost h of a firm is set to represent 1/3 of the mean productivity of
an employee, to be consistent with survey results reported by Hamermesh (1993). Unemployment
benefits are calibrated to reproduce the mean observed replacement ratio (Martin, 1996). The
public wage wg is calibrated to reproduce the mean wage gap between the public and private
sectors. The payroll tax rate τ is calibrated such as the public budget constraint is balanced. Our
calibration is sum-up in Table 1.
TAB. 1 — Baseline values of parameters
r el eu η γ p A qpF (R) qg h z wg τ
.015 0 .54 .5 .5 1 1 .04 .019 1/3px¯ .12w¯p 1.18w¯p .21
3 Public jobs creation and labor market flows
We analyze the eﬀects of public jobs creation on the labor market. Externalities arise as this public
policy reinforces the competition between public and private jobs and the fiscal distorsions. A rise
12
in public employment increases the public share of the labor force and decreases the private share.
Out-of steady state, unemployment decreases in the short term.
3.1 Steady-state eﬀects of public jobs creation
We study in this section the steady-state eﬀects of a public jobs creation on the unemployment
rate. The impact of public employment goes through an "attracting eﬀect", i.e. voluntary workers’
flows between sectors, and a "tax eﬀect", which changes private-sector job creation and destruction
conditions.
An increase in the public employment rate lg improves job opportunities of unemployed workers
searching for a public job. Their expected utility increase. As unemployed workers search in the
sector that gives the best return, these utility gains attract unemployed workers searching for a
private job. Voluntary unemployed workers’ flows between sectors induce a congestion eﬀect which
reduces the probability to move into public employment g. These moves permit to maintain the
indiﬀerence of unemployed workers to the two sectors. Then, the attracting eﬀect increases the
number of unemployed workers searching for a public job ug and reduces the number of unemployed
workers searching for a private job up (Graph 2).
Due to the decrease in the private unemployment rate, with vp given, the private labor market
tightness θ tends to increase. So, the probabilitym(θ) that a match occurs between an unemployed
worker and a vacant job in the private sector decreases, making the expected cost of hiring a worker
higher. Moreover, it increases the private wage pressure as the exit rate from private unemployment
θm(θ) increases. Firms open less vacancies such as the labor market tightness θ and the private
wage w¯p remain unchanged. The attracting eﬀect reduces the number of private employed workers
lp (Graph 2).
0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18
lg
0.09
0.095
0.105
0.11
0.115
0.12
Probability to move into public employment
0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18
lg
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
Tax rate
0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18
lg
0.77935
0.7794
0.77945
0.7795
0.77955
Reservation productivity
0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 lg
2.265
2.275
2.28
2.285
Private labor market tightness
GRAPH. 1 — The steady-state eﬀects on R, θ, g and τ
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Under the budget constraint, the tax rate τ increases in order to finance new public jobs. This
increases the private-sector net cost of labor, decreasing the expected return from a job. Firms
open less vacancies, making the labor market tightness θ lower. As profitability conditions are
changed, the reservation productivity R increases (Graph 1). There are less job creations and
more job destructions. The tax eﬀect increase the level of private unemployment up and decreases
the level of private employment lp. Moreover, the increase in the tax rate τ and the decrease in
the labor market tightness θ reduce the worker’s bargaining strength. Firm partially shift the tax
burden onto workers: the private wage rate w¯p and the expected utility of a private unemployed
worker decrease. Then, the attracting eﬀect is reinforced: more unemployed workers move from
the private sector to the public sector. These additional workers’ flows induce a higher public
unemployment rate ug, decreasing the public labor market tightness. The exit rate from public
unemployment g falls such as unemployed workers remain indiﬀerent to the two sectors (Graph 1).
Whereas the attracting eﬀect decreases the private unemployment rate up through workers’
flows between sectors, the tax eﬀect increases it due to the fall in the expected return from a
private job. The net eﬀect will depend on the parameter values which aﬀect the probabilities to
move on the labor market and the private-sector job creation and destruction conditions. With
our calibration, the attracting eﬀect dominates the tax eﬀect, as the private unemployment rate
reaches a lower new steady-state value (Graph 2)8. The steady-state eﬀects of public jobs creation
are to decrease the private-sector labor force (lp+up) and to increase the public-sector labor force
(lg + ug). There are more unemployed workers u in this economy (Graph 2).
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GRAPH. 2 — The steady-state eﬀects on u, ug, lp and up
8Let us consider an higher replacement rate, which improves the worker’s bargaining strength. The expected
return of a job is lower and the tax eﬀect induces a higher increase in R. The tax eﬀect dominates theattracting
eﬀect, and the private unemployment rate increases.
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3.2 Out-of Steady-State Dynamics
We analyze, in this section, the out of steady-state dynamics of the unemployment rate.
Instantaneously
Instantaneously, newly created public jobs are filled by the unemployed workers searching for
a public job. Thus, the public-sector unemployment rate ug instantaneously falls (Graph 4)9.
The increase in public employment rate is financed through a rise in the tax rate τF such as the
intertemporal budget constraint remains balanced. This tax rises the private-sector net cost of
labor. Therefore, it aﬀects the private-sector job creation and destruction conditions. The reserva-
tion productivity R increases and the labor market tightness θ decreases. The job destruction rate
qpF (R) goes up to a higher value, but instantaneously all jobs whose idiosyncratic productivity
x is below the new value of R are destroyed. Thus, at the time of the impact, the private job
destruction rate jumps to a higher value and then returns to its new steady state value. Given
the mass of jobs destroyed, there is instantaneously an over-adjustment of the job destruction rate
relatively to its real new steady state value. The private unemployment rate instantaneously rises
(Graph 4). The private job creation rate falls (Graph 3), but because private unemployment rate
rises with the instantaneous destruction of new unprofitable jobs, it does not fall by the full amount
that would have fallen at given up10. Thus, instantaneously, the private-sector employment rate lp
decreases (Graph 4). The public jobs creation instantaneously decreases the public unemployment
rate ug and the private employment rate lp and increases the private unemployment rate up. The
total unemployment rate u instantaneously falls (Graph 4). This fall is lower than the one in public
employment rate due to instantaneous private job destructions11 .
10 20 30 40
quarters
0.03997
0.03998
0.03999
0.04
0.04001
Private job creation rate
GRAPH. 3 — Out-of steady-state dynamic of the private job creation rate
9Note that the sign of this result would not be aﬀected assuming endogenous labor market participation. With
public goods valuable out of the labor market, even if public jobs creation improves employment outlooks, workers
would choose to stay out of the labor force or to leave it.
10 See Pissarides (2000) for more details.
11As stressed by Hamermesh (1993), true dynamic firms’ responses take time. These decisions are aﬀected by the
structure of the adjustment costs and by how employers forecast the path of shocks. There could be discontinuities
in firm’s responses to a shock. If public jobs creation changes the cost of setting up a vacancy, it doesn’t mean that
private firms reduce job creation in a smooth way. There might be some inertia, and only when lost profits from
being out of equilibrium are large, job creation behavior is altered. Assuming fixed costs, the dynamic would be
roughly the same: the labor demand would jump. Assuming variable costs, the adjustment of employment would
be slower.
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Labor market dynamics
We simulate the labor market dynamics due to a 1% increase in the public employment rate.
The public job creation rate
gug
lg
decreases whereas the public job destruction rate
qglg
lg
does not
change. The public-sector unemployment rate ug has to increase (Graph 4) until the public job
creation rate rises up to the level of the public job destruction rate (equation 2). The mean lag of
the public unemployment rate is close to 7 quarters12. The increase in ug is obtained through a
move of unemployed workers from the private sector to the public sector (Section 3.1). Dynamic
adjustment in the private unemployment and employment rates follows the jumps in R and θ:
the private unemployment rate up increases and the private employment rate lp decreases. In the
very short term, this makes the private job creation rate
θm(θ)up
lp
increases (Graph 3) whereas the
private job destruction rate
qpF (R)lp
lp
is on its new steady state value. There is an over-adjustment
of the job creation rate, before it reaches its new steady state value. This behavior is due to the
instantaneous jump in the job destruction rate. A fraction of the private labor force becomes
unemployed. The number of workers who wait for a job and the job creation rate increase. Due to
voluntary private workers’ moves, the private-sector unemployment rate up decreases. The private
job creation rate
θm(θ)up
lp
decreases to reach the level of the private job destruction rate (Graph
3). The private employment rate lp unambiguously decreases (Graph 4). Total unemployment u
starts moving according to (3). The new steady-state level of unemployment u is higher than in
the initial steady-state equilibrium (Graph 4).
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GRAPH. 4 — Out-of steady-state dynamics of the unemployment and employment rates
The mean lag for unemployment’s adjustment is close to 7 quarters13 . With our calibration,
12See Appendix 6.3.
13 See Appendix 6.3.
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creation of one public job destroys 2.12 private jobs and increases the number of unemployed
workers by 1.12. There are relatively more public-sector unemployed workers (the number rises by
1.17) and less private-sector unemployed workers (the number falls by 0.05) compared to the initial
steady-state equilibrium. The size of the crowding-out eﬀect would be the same with a complete
shifting of the tax burden onto workers. It depends on the attraction that public sector exerts
(relative wages, job security, non wages benefits,...). In our model, public job security and wage
premium aﬀect this attraction. Higher public wages and less "risky" jobs will attract more workers
into wait unemployment in the public sector, ceteris paribus. And the higher the attraction, the
higher the crowding-out eﬀect.
4 A SVAR analysis of the dynamic eﬀects of public jobs
creation
We study the dynamic eﬀects of public jobs creation on the unemployment rate, using a svar
technique. This work consists in estimating the unconstrained reduced form summarizing the joint
process of our variables. Then it consists in using a set of just-identifying restrictions to go from the
reduced-form innovations to a set of uncorrelated structural innovations. We report the impulse
response functions (irf) of each variable to an innovation in each shock equivalent to a 1% point
rise. We analyze the contribution of each structural shock to the variance of the k-quarter ahead
forecast error for each endogenous variable.
4.1 Svar specification
Data
The data were obtained from the oecd Employment Outlooks database. The unemployment
rate is the ratio of unemployment to the total labor force (Figure 1). The public employment rate
is the ratio of general government employment to the labor force. According to the oecd definition
(1997), public employment consists of jobs in central and local administrations, in non-profit orga-
nizations controlled or financed by public administrations and in military and diplomatic entities
(Figure 1). The definition does not include public firms owned or controlled by the government.
The private real wage rate corresponds to the ratio of private wages on the gdp deflator (Figure
2).
18
in quarters
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
PUBLIC
UNR
FIG. 1 — Public employment and unemployment rates in United-States from 1972:2 to 1993:4
We use the job creation and destruction rates calculated by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992)
(which combined information from the Longitidunal Research Datafile and the Current Population
Survey). They measure workers’ inflows and outflows for the us establishments of 5 employees and
more in the manufacturing sector14 (Figure 3). Sample runs from 1972:2 to 1993:4.
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FIG. 2 — Private real wage rate, United-States (1972:2-1993:4). Source: OCDE.
14As the manufacturing sector not produces substitutable goods for public ones, we expect that the eﬀect of public
employment on private job flows only goes through wages and taxes.
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FIG. 3 — Private manufactured job creation and job destruction rates in United States from
1972:2 to 1993:4
Specification
Data are available at a quarterly frequency and are seasonally adjusted. We have introduced
in our model dummies for recessions. adf (and Phillips-Perron) and kpss unit root tests are
performed (Appendix 6.4). They indicate that public employment series pub and private real wage
rates w are stationary in first diﬀerence I(1) whereas unemployment series cho, private job creation
c and destruction rates d series are I(0). The optimal var lag-length is derived from the usual
criteria (aic, bic, ...), leading to a choice of 2 lags. Estimated residuals satisfy all specification
tests and our model satisfies stability tests.
4.2 Structural innovations identification
We estimate the following reduced-form model:
A(L)


∆pubt
chot
∆wt
ct
dt


=


u∆pubt
uchot
u∆wt
uct
udt


with pub the public employment rate, cho the unemployment rate, w the private real wage rate,
c the job creation rate and d the private job destruction rate in the manufacturing sector. ut is
the vector of reduced-form innovations. This reduced-form summarizes the sample information
about the joint process of our variables. To go from the reduced-form innovations to uncorrelated
structural innovations, one needs a set of identifying restrictions. The orthogonalization of reduced-
form innovations allows us to disentangle the dynamic eﬀects of each disturbance. We use here
short-run restrictions, i.e. we constrain the contemporaneous eﬀects of innovations on our variables.
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We assume the existence of five structural disturbances: a public shock εgt , a supply shock ε
s
t , a
wage shock εwt , an aggregate demand shock ε
a
t and a reallocation shock ε
r
t .
Orthogonalization of reduced-form innovations
Reduced-form innovations are related to structural innovations by:
ut = Dεt ⇔


u∆pubt
uchot
u∆wt
uct
udt


=


d11 d12 d13 d14 d15
d21 d22 d23 d24 d25
d31 d32 d33 d34 d35
d41 d42 d43 d44 d45
d51 d52 d53 d54 d55




εgt
εst
εwt
εat
εrt


(18)
where ut is the vector of reduced-form innovations, εt the vector of white-noise innovations to
structural disturbances and D a matrix of full rank. The relation (18) can be expressed in terms
of covariance matrices:
V




u∆pubt
uchot
u∆wt
uct
udt




= V




d11 d12 d13 d14 d15
d21 d22 d23 d24 d25
d31 d32 d33 d34 d35
d41 d42 d43 d44 d45
d51 d52 d53 d54 d55




εgt
εst
εwt
εat
εrt




⇔ Σu = D
0
ΣεD (19)
where Σu is the covariance matrix of reduced-form innovations and Σε the one of structural in-
novations. Given the assumption of zero correlation across innovations, the covariance matrix of
the structural innovations is diagonal. It includes 5 unknowns. Matrix D includes 25 unknown
parameters. The relation (19) contains 30 unknown parameters. As the covariance matrix, Σu,
contains 15 independent moments (this matrix is symmetrical), we only need 15 just-identifying
restrictions. We normalize the diagonal elements of D to unity. We need 10 short-run restrictions
on D.
Structural innovations definition
- Innovations in public employment are attributed to public jobs innovations εgt . In our model,
a theoretical mechanism is proposed that explain the dynamic eﬀects of public jobs creation.
Newly created public jobs are instantaneously filled by unemployed workers: a public employment
shock has an instantaneous negative impact on the unemployment rate (d21 < 0). Due to its
fiscal implications, we expect a decrease in private job creation (d41 < 0) and an increase in job
destruction (d51 > 0). The matching process does not allow jump in job formation whereas job
destructions can arise without delay. Empirical studies confirm that job destructions are more
volatile than job creations (Davis et al., 1990, 1992). The contemporaneous job creation response
to the shock is smaller in magnitude than the contemporaneous destruction response (d41 = −xd51
with 0 < x < 1). Private wages (d31 > 0) can increase if public jobs creation induces a wage
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pressure de to the attracting eﬀect. But, they can decrease (d31 < 0) if firms shift the tax burden
onto workers. We normalize the public employment response to 1 (d11 = 1). We constrain the
value of the unemployment response d21 = −115. This assumption allows to disentangle the public
shock from an aggregate demand shock. We fix x using the relative elasticities of job creation and
job destruction to public employment (x = 0.2). We check robustness assuming that d21 can take
a value on the range [−1.7,−0.6] and x on [0.2, 0.4].
- As in Blanchard (1989), innovations in unemployment are attributed to supply innovations εst .
These innovations reflect changes in productivity. These can induce a change in the composition
of the labor force. The job reallocation induced by this shock highly increases job destructions
(d52 > 0). Job creations can decrease or increase, but this response must be lower in magnitude.
In order to distinguish this supply shock to aggregate and reallocation shocks, we assume that job
creations remain unchanged at the time of the shock (d42 = 0) (Karamé et al., 1998). Then, the
supply shock has a positive impact on the unemployment rate (d22 > 0). This shock should permit
an increase in wages (d32 > 0) (Blanchard, 1989). We normalize the unemployment response to 1
(d22 = 1). We constrain the value of job creations response to be null d42 = 0. We fix d32 with the
value of the elasticity of real wages to the marginal productivity of labor (d32 = 0.2) (Blanchard,
1989). We check robustness assuming that d42 can take a value on the range [−1, 1] and d32 on
[.15, 2.3].
- Innovations in real wages are attributed to wage-setting innovations εwt , which can reflect a
change in bargaining strength. A wage-setting shock increases real wages (d33 > 0). We expect that
this shock induces a decrease in private job creation (d43 < 0) and an increase in job destruction
(d53 > 0) with a higher response of job destruction d43 = −yd53 with 0 < y < 1. Unemployment
jumps if there are instantaneous job creations or destructions. It do not respond to wage-setting
innovations (d23 = 0). We normalize the real wage response to 1 (d33 = 1). We fix y using the
relative elasticities of job creation and job destruction to real wages (y = 0.2). We constrain the
unemployment response d23 = 0. We check robustness assuming that y can take a value on [0.1, 1[.
- Aggregate disturbances cause creation and destruction to move in opposite directions (Davis et
al., 1999). Aggregate demand innovations εat increase the job creation rate (d44 > 0) and decreases
the job destruction rate (d54 < 0). Empirical studies conclude that the contemporaneous job
destruction response is at least as large as the contemporaneous creation response (|d43| ≥ |d33|).
Then, the unemployment rate instantaneously decreases (we expect d24 < 0). Wages and prices
increase with a demand shock. In the short run, real wages slightly increase (Gamber and Joutz,
15 Instantaneously, new public jobs are assumed to be filled by unemployed workers, with a constant labor force
participation.
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1993) or decrease (Blanchard, 1989). As we normalize the job creation response to 1 (d44 = 1), the
job destruction response must be higher than 1 in absolute value. We constrain its value at the
opposite of the value of the ratio between the standard errors of destruction and creation series
(d54 = −1.55) (Karamé et al., 1998). We fix d34 using the elasticity of real wages to job creations
(d34 = 0.07). Note that using a negative value would have minor eﬀects. We check robustness
assuming that d54 can take a value on the range [−4,−1].
- Reallocation disturbances cause creation and destruction to move in the same direction (Davis
et al., 1999). Reallocation innovations εrt increase job destruction (d55 > 0) and job creation
(d45 ≥ 0). The contemporaneous job creation response to a reallocation innovation is smaller in
magnitude than the contemporaneous destruction response (|d55| ≥ |d45|). As we normalize the job
destruction response to 1 (d55 = 1), the job creation response must be lower or equal to 1 (Karamé
et al., 1998). We assume that the contemporaneous response of job creation is the same as the job
destruction response (d45 = 1). Then, a reallocation shock has no impact on the unemployment
rate (d25 = 0). We check robustness assuming that d45 can take a value on the range [0, 1].
Matrix D reads:
D =


1 d12 d13 d14 d15
−1.7 1 0 d24 0
d31 0.2 1 0.07 d35
−0.2d51 0 −0.2d53 1 1
d51 d52 d53 −1.55 1


4.3 Results
We report in Appendix 6.5 the impulse response functions of public employment, unemployment,
private job creations and destructions rates, i.e. the dynamic response of the level16 of each of the
endogenous variables to innovations in each of the four structural disturbances. Each figure gives
both point estimates and one-standard deviation bands obtained by bootstrap simulations.
Impulse Response Functions
- The dynamic eﬀects of a public shock are characterized on the first graph (Graph 8). A
one-standard deviation shock leads to a decrease in job creations of 0.05 percent and to an in-
crease in job destructions of 0.254 percent. As new public jobs are created, the shock induces a
significative decrease in unemployment of 0.06 percent. Due to instantaneous destructions and to
the disincentives to create private jobs, private employment is reduced. This makes the private
job creation rate increase of 0.135 percent in the third quarter. Then job creations return to their
equilibrium value and the eﬀects are not significantly diﬀerent from zero after the fourth quarter.
16As public employment rate is I(1), we report the accumulated impulse response function of public employment
to innovations in each structural disturbance.
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Due to these private job creations, unemployment decreases of 0.151 percent in the sixth quarter.
Then it reaches its steady state value and there are no significant eﬀect after 2 years. This shock
significantly increases public employment growth. So a public shock has a significative negative
impact on unemployment in the short run. The mean adjustment time of unemployment to a
public shock is 14 quarters (3.5 years). As in our model, firms shift the tax burden onto workers:
private real wages decline of 0.626 percent, but not significantly.
- The dynamic eﬀects of a supply shock are characterized on the second graph (Graph 9). A one-
standard deviation shock leads to an increase in job destructions 0.290 percent and a constrained
null impact on job creations. This makes unemployment increase of 0.135 percent (Blanchard,
1989, Blanchard and Quah, 1989, Gamber et al., 1993). Then job creations increase of 0.183 in the
third quarter (this supply impulse can be interpreted as a labor recomposing eﬀect). Job creations
return to their equilibrium value and the eﬀects are no more significant after 6 quarters. Public
employment growth increases of 0.04, but its response is not significantly diﬀerent from zero after
2 quarters. Although public employment is in first diﬀerence, supply shock makes it return to its
steady-state value in the long run. Supply innovations decrease more nominal prices than nominal
wages. So, real wages increase but this eﬀect is not significant (Blanchard, 1989).
- The dynamic eﬀects of a wage-setting shock are characterized on the third graph (Graph
10). A one-standard deviation shock leads to a decrease in job creations of 0.041 percent and
an increase of job destructions of 0.206 percent in the first quarter. Then, private job creations
increase of 0.089 percent in the second quarter, but these responses are not statistically significant.
By assumption, unemployment instantaneously do not respond to the wage-setting shock, then
it decreases, although not significantly so (Blanchard, 1989). This shock significantly increases
real wages of 1.008 percent in the first quarter. A wage-setting makes public employment growth
increase, but this eﬀect is not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
- The dynamic eﬀects of a positive aggregate demand shock are characterized on the fourth
graph (Graph 11). A one-standard deviation shock leads to an increase in job creations of 0.264
percent and an higher decrease in job destructions of 0.423 percent. So, it induces a decrease in
unemployment of 0.129 percent in the first quarter. Its eﬀects on job flows are not significantly
diﬀerent from zero after the shock (Karamé et al., 1998). In the first year, the aggregate shock leads
to a significant fall in unemployment of 0.215 percent. Then unemployment returns to its steady-
state value (this increase is not significantly diﬀerent from zero after 2 years) (Blanchard, 1989,
Blanchard et al., 1989, Gamber et al., 1993). Aggregate disturbances make the public employment
growth increase of 0.032 percent (this rise is not significant after the first quarter). Aggregate
24
disturbances make real wages increase of 0.018 percent in the first quarter and then decrease,
though these eﬀects are statistically insignificant (Blanchard, 1989).
- The dynamic eﬀects of a reallocation shock are characterized on the fifth graph (Graph
12). A one-standard deviation shock leads to an increase in job creations and destructions of
0.284 percent. This shock has no instantaneous eﬀect on unemployment as we’ve constrained it.
The impact on job creations are more persistent: job destructions quickly fall after the shock
whereas job creations slightly decrease (Karamé et al., 1998) (the eﬀects on job creations are not
significantly diﬀerent from zero after 6 quarters). This makes unemployment decrease, but without
any significant eﬀect. Reallocation disturbances decrease the public employment growth but this
eﬀect is not significantly diﬀerent from zero. Reallocation disturbances tend to decrease real wages
but the response is statistically insignificant at all horizons.
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
We report in Appendix 6.6 the contribution of each source of innovations to the variance of the n-
quarter ahead forecast error for each endogenous variable. Table 5 reports variance decompositions
for the first diﬀerence of public employment rate and for the levels of unemployment, job creation
and destruction rates.
- Innovations to aggregate demand, εat , and innovations to either labor supply or productivity,
εst , account for the most of the variance of unemployment in the short run: one quarter ahead,
they account for 43.16 percent and 47.3 percent of the variance of cho, respectively (Blanchard,
1989, Blanchard et al., 1989, Gamber et al., 1993, Dolado and Lopez-Salido, 1996). Eight quarters
ahead, εat still accounts for 53.73 percent of the variance of cho, whereas this proportion has
decreased for εst (16.14 percent). Innovations to public employment, ε
g
t , account for a growing part
of the variance of cho (31.19 percent in the long run). In the long run, εat and ε
g
t jointly explain
83.83 percent of the variance of cho. Reallocation innovations εrt not explain the variance of cho.
This is true by assumption for the one-quarter ahead variance: identification restriction imposes
that unemployment doesn’t respond to εrt . It is however true at longer horizons: in the long run,
they account for 3.33 percent of the variance of cho. Wage-setting innovations εwt not explain
the variance of cho. This is true by assumption for the one-quarter ahead variance: identification
restriction imposes that unemployment doesn’t respond to εwt . It is however true at longer horizons:
in the long run, they account for 1.8 percent of the variance of cho (Blanchard, 1989).
- Innovations to aggregate demand, εat , and reallocation innovations, ε
r
t , account for the most
of the variance of private job creations in the short run: one quarter ahead, they account for 45.08
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percent and 52.16 percent of the variance of c, respectively (Karamé et al., 1998). By assumption,
for the one-quarter ahead variance, supply innovations, εst , do not explain the variance of c. Eight
quarters ahead, εst accounts for 17.33 percent of the variance of the forecast error. In the long run,
εrt account for the most part of the variance: they explain 50 percent (Karamé et al., 1998). Eight
quarters ahead, public innovations, εgt , accounts for 9.1 percent of the variance of c. Wage-setting
innovations, εwt , explain 5 percent of the variance of c.
- Innovations to aggregate demand, εat , dominate all other innovations at all horizons: one
quarter ahead, they account for 39.69 percent of the variance of private job destructions and
ten years ahead, this proportion is 43.39 percent (Karamé et al., 1998). Innovations to public
employment, εgt , account for 14 percent of the variance of d at all horizons. So, a change in public
job creations changes incentives for private job destructions. Supply innovations, εst , contribute to
18 percent of the variance of d at all horizons.
- Wage-setting innovations, εwt , account for the most part of the variance of private real wage
rate in the short run: one quarter ahead, they account for 70 percent of the variance of w. Eight
quarters ahead, public innovations, εgt , account for 30 percent of the variance of the forecast error of
w. In the long run, εwt and ε
g
t jointly explain 91 percent of the variance of w. This high contribution
of the public shock is convenient with our intuition: public jobs creation aﬀects real wages but the
net eﬀect is ambiguous.
- Public innovations, εgt , innovations to aggregate demand, ε
a
t , and reallocation innovations,
εrt , jointly account for 93.23 percent of the variance of public employment ten years ahead. One
quarter ahead, innovations to either labor supply or productivity, εst , account for 37.5 percent of
the variance of pub. This result reinforces our intuition: public job creations decisions partly are
due to innovations in labor supply, that make unemployment higher, in the very short term. In
long term, these are due to innovations in aggregate demand.
5 Conclusion
We use a dynamic matching model and study how public jobs creation aﬀects workers’ decisions
to move on the labor market and private-sector firms’ job creation and destruction decisions.
Instantaneously, newly created public jobs are filled by the unemployed workers searching for a
public job. Thus, in the short run, the unemployment rate decreases and the public sector exerts an
attracting eﬀect on private workers. Due to its fiscal implications, public jobs creation aﬀects the
private-sector job creation and destruction decisions. The disincentives for private jobs creation
that distortive labor taxes generate make the unemployment rate increase. In the long run, the net
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impact depends on the size of the public wage premium. With our calibration, public jobs creation
increases unemployment. The mean lag of the unemployment rate is close to 7 quarters. True
dynamic firms ’responses take time. Here, we assume that there is no adjustment cost. However,
there might be some inertia in private job creation and destruction decisions. Then, the adjustment
time of the unemployment rate should be slower.
As an empirical illustration, we estimate a svar model that focuses on the consequences of
public jobs creation on unemployment dynamics. We use us data on public employment, unem-
ployment, private-sector job creation and destruction rates, obtained from the oecd Employment
Outlooks, lrd and cps database. Sample runs from 1972:2 to 1993:4. We assume the existence
of four structural disturbances: a public shock, a supply shock, an aggregate shock and a real-
location shock. We use short-run restrictions in the spirit of Blanchard (1989), Karamé et al.
(1998) and Davis el al. (1999). Our results are consistent with the svar literature. We obtain
that the unemployment rate significantly decreases in the short-run with a public shock. It is true
by assumption for the one-quarter ahead: identification restriction imposes that unemployment
negatively responds to the public shock. But it also is true for six quarters-ahead17. Then the
unemployment rate reaches its steady-state value and there are no significant eﬀect after 2 years.
The mean adjustment time of unemployment to a public shock is 3.5 years. This motivates a gov-
ernment response to a change in unemployment. Innovations in public employment account for a
significant part of the variance of private job destructions. Job creation dynamics are consistent to
those obtained in our theoretical model. Job destructions are more volatile than job creations and
they faster reach their steady-state value. In the same way, this is consistent with our matching
model. As we expected it, the response of private wages to a public shock is ambiguous. We ob-
tain a non statistically significant eﬀect. This ambiguity comes from conflicting externalities that
public jobs creation generates: the attraction eﬀect increases workers’ wage demands whereas tax
distortions reduce workers’ bargaining strength. The high contribution of the public shock to the
variance of private wages is consistent with our intuition: public employment aﬀects private wages
but this eﬀect is ambiguous. We can conclude that our svar model is a good empirical illustration
for our theoretical model. Note that the lack of data and the use of a bootstrap simulation of
one-standard deviation bands constrain the significativity of the impulse response functions. It
would be interesting to replicate this empirical exercise on other countries. However, we do not
have data on manufactured private-sector job creations and destructions (for France, we only have
17 In our model, the assumption of continuous wage renegociation not allows this result. The unemployment rate
instantaneously "jumps" with public jobs creation and private jobs destruction. Then it monotically reaches its new
steady-state value.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Phase diagram
In Section 2.5, we present the out-of steady-state dynamics of the unemployment rate u(t). We
propose here to use a graphical method in order to illustrate the stability of our solution. With
jump variables, the two diﬀerential equations (3) and (2) of our model read:½
u˙(t) = qpF (R)(1− lg − ug(t)) + qglg − θm(θ) (u(t)− ug(t))− gug(t)
u˙g(t) = qglg − gug(t)
And can be rewritten:·
u˙(t)
u˙g(t)
¸
=
·
−θm(θ) θm(θ)− qpF (R)− g
0 −g
¸ ·
u(t)
ug(t)
¸
+
·
qpF (R)(1− lg) + qglg
qglg
¸
The diagonal matrix of eigenvalues D is given by
D =


−2(θm(θ) + g) +
p
2θm(θ)g
2
0
0
−
p
2θm(θ)g
2


The negative sign of both eigenvalues confirm that the system is stable (Graph 5).
First case
The locus of points for which u˙ equals 0 is the upward-sloping line ug =
θm(θ)u− qpF (R)(1− lg)− qglg
θm(θ)− qpF (R)− g
,
under the constraint θm(θ) − qpF (R) − g > 018 . The u˙ = 0 crosses the horizontal axis at point
u¯ =
qpF (R)(1− lg) + qglg
θm(θ)
. If we start at a point on the u˙ = 0 schedule and increase u a bit,
then the right-hand side of the expression for u˙ decreases. Hence, u˙ becomes negative and u is
decreasing in that region. The arrows in this region point south. A symmetric argument implies
that the arrows point north for points to the right of the u˙ = 0 schedule (Graph 5).
The u˙g(t) = 0 locus is given by u∗g =
qglg
g
, a vertical line. The expression for u˙g implies that if
ug rises, then u˙g decreases. Hence, to the right of the u˙g = 0 locus, u˙g is negative, and the arrows
point west. The arrows point east for points to the left of the u˙g = 0 schedule (Graph 5).
The steady state is the point at which the two loci cross, a condition that corresponds in this
case to 


u∗ = u∗g +
qpF (R)(1− lg − u∗g)
θm(θ)
u∗g =
qglg
g
18This is the case of our model.
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GRAPH. 5 — The phase diagram in the first stable case
Second case
The locus of points for which u˙ equals 0 is the downward-sloping line ug =
θm(θ)u− qpF (R)(1− lg)− qglg
θm(θ)− qpF (R)− g
,
under the constraint θm(θ) − qpF (R) − g < 0. The u˙ = 0 schedule crosses the horizontal axis at
point u¯ =
qpF (R)(1− lg) + qglg
θm(θ)
and the vertical axis at point u¯g = −
qpF (R)(1− lg) + qglg
θm(θ)− qpF (R)− g
. As
previously, the u˙g(t) = 0 locus is given by u∗g =
qglg
g
, a vertical line. In the case u∗g < u¯g, the
system is stable as for any initial values of u and ug, the dynamics of the system takes it back to
the steady state (Graph 6). In the case u∗g > u¯g, the two loci do not cross. There is no steady
state.
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GRAPH. 6 — The phase diagram in the second stable case
6.2 Out-of steady-state dynamics
Consider the case of unemployment benefits index-linked on current private wages, such as there
is a complete shifting of the tax burden onto workers. In this case, private-sector job creation
and destruction decisions remain unchanged. Assume the government can’t rent into debt. The
budget constraint has to be fulfilled at any moment in time. The out-of steady-state dynamic
of unemployment is given by equation (3). The dynamics of τ , wp and g can be deduced. The
zero profit condition on vacant jobs, the sharing rule, the reservation property and the arbitrage
condition are instantaneous relations. We allow wages to be renegotiated continually such as the
sharing rule holds in rates of change S˙(x) = W˙ pe (x) − W˙ pu + J˙p(x) − V˙ p. Therefore, the wage
equation (10) holds in and out of the steady-state
wp(x) =
γ(px+ hθ)
1 + τ
1
1− (1− γ)b ,
with xε]R, eu] and b a constant replacement ratio. Out-of steady-state, the expected capital gains
from changes in jobs value and in utilities are not null. The exit rate from public-sector unemploy-
ment is given by the following arbitrage condition:
g
wg − bw¯p
r + qg + g
+ g
W˙ eg − W˙ug
r + qg + g
+ W˙ug =
γhθ
(1− γ)(1 + τ) + W˙
u
p .
We assume that firms can destroy unprofitable jobs without delay. This assumption implies that
the zero-profit condition satisfied by R holds in and out of steady state Jp(R) = J˙p(R) = 0. We
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also assume that firms can open and close vacancies without delay. This assumption implies that
the zero-profit condition for new vacancies holds in and out of steady state V p = V˙ p = 0. We
simulate the eﬀect of a 1% public employment increase on the out-of steady-state dynamics of u.
Unemployment rate
0.0444
0.0448
0.0452
0.0456
0.046
0.0464
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
quarters
GRAPH. 7 — Out-of steady-state dynamic of unemployment rate
6.3 Mean lags of the unemployment rates
To derive the mean lag of the public unemployment rate ug, we solve the diﬀerential equation (2).
We obtain:
ug(t) = u
∗
g + (ug0 − u∗g)e−[g]t,
with u∗g the steady-state level of public unemployment, and ug0 the initial level of public unem-
ployment.
The mean lag (half-life) Tg is defined by:
u∗g − ug(Tg) = (1− 0.5)(u∗g − ug0),
that is
Tg =
− ln 0.5
g
The mean lag of the public unemployment rate negatively depends on the new exit rate from public
unemployment g.
To derive the mean lag of the unemployment rate u, we solve the two-diﬀerential equation
system (3) and (2):½
u˙(t) = qpF (R)[1− lg − ug(t)] + qglg − θm(θ)[u(t)− ug(t)]− gug(t)
u˙g(t) = qglg − gug(t)
We obtain:
u(t) = u∗ + (u0 − u∗)e−[qpF (R)+θm(θ)]t
+
1
g − qpF (R)− θm(θ)
[θm(θ)− g]
¡
ug0 − u∗g
¢ h
e−[qpF (R)+θm(θ)]t − e−(g)t
i
,
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with u∗ and u∗g the steady-state levels of total and public unemployment, and u0 and ug0 the initial
levels of total and public unemployment, respectively.
The mean lag T is given by:
u∗ − u(T ) = (1− 0.5)(u∗ − u0).
The properties of Tg and T are sum-up in Table 2.
TAB. 2 — Mean lags
r qg qp γ z
T(g) — — — 0 +
6.4 Unit root tests
We report unit root tests. In the case of the adf test, the null hypothesis describes a non-
stationnary process (if t-statistic < critical value, the null can be rejected). The null hypothesis
describes a stationnary process in the case of the kpss test (if t-statistic > critical value, the null
can be rejected).
TAB.3 — Augmented Dikey-Fuller unit root tests
ADF
Séries Retard optimal Stat Stat Stat
pubt 1 -0.94 I(1) -1.22 I(1) -0.86 I(1)
chot 1 -0.47 I(1) -3.23 I(0)∗∗ -3.21 I(0)∗
wt 3 0.12 I(1) -1.45 I(1) -3.22 I(0)∗
ct 0 -0.53 I(1) -3.44 I(0)∗∗ -4.7 I(0)∗∗∗
dt 1 -0.82 I(1) -3.75 I(0)∗∗∗ -3.85 I(0)∗∗
Note: The first stat denotes unit root test statistics based on a regression without constant, the second with a
constant, the third with a constant and a trend. * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at
the 1% level.
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TAB.4 — kpss unit root tests
KPSS
Séries Retard optimal Stat Stat
pubt 1 3.167 I(1) 0.747 I(1)
chot 1 0.380 I(0)∗∗ 0.386 I(1)
wt 3 1.284 I(1) 0.363 I(1)
ct 0 3.48 I(1) 0.08 I(0)∗∗∗
dt 1 0.287 I(0)∗∗∗ 0.122 I(0)∗∗
Note: The first stat denotes unit root test statistics based on a regression with a constant, the second with a
constant and a trend. * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
6.5 Impulse Response Functions
GRAPH. 8a — Responses to a one-standard deviation public shock
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GRAPH. 8b — Responses to a one-standard deviation public shock
GRAPH. 9a — Responses to a one-standard deviation supply shock
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GRAPH. 9b — Responses to a one-standard deviation supply shock
GRAPH. 10a — Responses to a one-standard deviation wage shock
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GRAPH. 10b — Responses to a one-standard deviation wage shock
GRAPH. 11a — Responses to a one-standard deviation aggregate demand shock
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GRAPH. 11b — Responses to a one-standard deviation aggregate demand shock
GRAPH. 12a — Responses to a one-standard deviation reallocation shock
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GRAPH. 12b — Responses to a one-standard deviation reallocation shock
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6.6 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
TAB. 5 — Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Quarter aheads εgt impulse ε
s
t impulse ε
w
t impulse ε
a
t impulse ε
r
t impulse
Public employment rate
1 17.38 29.98 12.64 27.55 12.45
8 21.55 8.74 14.31 27.33 28.07
20 21.79 2.75 10.63 33.72 31.10
40 23.18 1.17 9.70 38.32 27.63
Unemployment rate
1 5.59 52.71 0.00 41.7 0.00
8 20.63 20.89 2.44 55.3 0.75
20 23.53 15.44 4.05 54.09 2.89
40 23.81 14.85 4.29 53.7 3.35
Private real wage rate
1 45.49 0.06 52.51 0.02 1.92
8 47.84 1.54 47.55 0.25 2.81
20 53.15 2.82 40.18 0.92 2.93
40 57.03 3.44 33.77 2.29 3.48
Private job creation rate
1 1.47 0.00 1.99 44.31 52.22
8 8.30 14.08 8.76 19.46 49.40
20 8.28 14.36 8.98 18.41 49.97
40 8.30 14.34 8.99 18.41 49.96
Private job destruction rate
1 12.66 15.64 17.13 36.61 17.96
8 12.61 16.55 15.03 41.24 14.58
20 12.74 16.4 15.04 41.07 14.75
40 12.76 16.39 15.04 41.07 14.75
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